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Abstract 
The issue of corporate governance has continued to gain widespread prominence in local and international business. Notably, 
audit committee is a key governance structure charged with oversight over financial reporting and disclosure that requires the 
audit committee members to be critically aware of and fully understand their oversight responsibilities. In recent years, interest in 
audit committees has increased dramatically, with a specific emphasis on member independence, experience and knowledge. 
This paper discusses on the corporate governance and audit committees’ qualities and some reviews on the recent literature 
relating to the most cited audit committee qualities i.e. audit committee’s composition and communications. Finally, this paper 
also identifies the suggestion made for the betterment of audit committee practices in Malaysia. 
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1. Introduction 
The setting of corporate governance regulations and practices in Malaysia mostly is influenced by the developed 
countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States of America (Liew, 2007). The Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (2012) defined corporate governance as: “The process and structure used to direct and 
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manage the business and affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability 
with the ultimate objective of realizing long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interests of other 
stakeholders.”  
The economic crisis in 1997 had affected seriously the Malaysia’s capital markets framework including its 
corporate governance regime (Zalailah & Jenny, 2012; Thomas, 2002; Mitton, 2002; Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 
2007). In reaction to the issue occurred in 1997, the Malaysian Government had established a high level Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) participated by almost all sectors across government bodies, private 
sectors, Central Bank of Malaysia, Malaysia Accounting Standard Board and association of banks. It is further 
expanded by the establishment of Capital Markets Strategic Committee in 1999. In 2000, the FCCG had issued the 
MCCG which required listed companies to disclose their level of compliance with its recommendations in view to 
provide a strong and facilitative regulatory regime including corporate accountability and high quality corporate 
governance mechanisms that would strengthen investor conﬁdence (Securities Commission, 2001).   
Alnasser (2012) noted that as compared to other Asian countries before the financial crisis hit Asia, Malaysia could 
be considered as the country which having strong governance guidelines. However, it did not help much from the 
crisis effects. Empirically, agency cost is identified as one of the factors that cause the weak of corporate governance 
practices in Malaysia. In addition, more voting rights of the external shareholders are also contributed to the weak 
board of trustee and market control. Therefore, the amended MCCG 2012 is aimed to generate an optimum level of 
positive relationship between stakeholder and the firm as well as to assure companies disclose relevant and 
necessary data in the annual report. 
As one of the main components of corporate governance, audit committees provide critical oversight of 
companies’ financial reporting and auditing processes (Salleh & Stewart, 2012; Cohen et al., 2007). The MCCG had 
recommended that the board of directors should establish an audit committee comprising at least three members, a 
majority of whom are independent plus all the members are non-executive directors. Written terms of reference 
which deal clearly with its authority and duties also need to be provided as references to committee. It is also 
suggested that the members of the audit committee are financially literate and at least one of them are members of 
an accounting association or body. 
According to Vanasco (1994), in the United Kingdom, the audit committee role has been discussed since 1872 
after the issuance of the Great Railway’s audit committee report which the committee functioning as per today audit 
committee role. However, until 1987, due to large and expanding corporate size and corporate fraud, the Bank of 
England, the Confederation of British Industry, and other financial institutions urged public companies to adopt 
audit committees to promote awareness on the importance of the role of the non-executive or independent outside 
director. Due to Enron corporate scandal, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 was established as to strengthened 
corporate governance related to the improvement in audit committees through stricter composition, increased 
disclosures and expanded responsibilities. Based on the UK’s Cadbury Committee Report, US’s Tread way 
Commission Report and Canadian Macdonald Commission, audit committee has been regarded as an important 
element in corporate organization which operates as an oversight body in implementing appropriate corporate 
accountability. 
2. Corporate governance and quality of audit committee 
An effective audit committee plays an important role in upholding good corporate governance practices. Audit 
committees members in companies are appointed by the management and the Boards of Directors (BOD) to 
supervise the financial activities of the company and also to function as liaison between the board of directors, 
internal and external auditors. It is a common practice that, the audit committee is made up of majority external 
directors. The primary responsibilities of the audit committee involve assisting the BOD on issue concerning 
financial reporting and internal control and communicating with BOD financial management, the independent 
auditors and internal auditors.  
Audit committee significant role portray the importance of audit committee function to ensure its corporate 
governance towards the shareholders. It is highlighted that the role of audit committee are to liaison with external 
auditor, appoint and terminate head of the internal audit department, monitor the reliability of financial statement 
and company’s performance and review the effectiveness of internal control and risk management of the company. 
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Companies experiencing ﬁnancial restatements due to errors can be regarded as having an ineffective audit 
committee in their monitoring role (Lary et al., 2012). It is claimed that, an effective audit committee can improve 
transparency for better protection of shareholder interests and enhancement of the value of the company (Yin et al., 
2012).  
3. Audit committee in Malaysian corporate governance 
The revised MCCG in 2007 are aimed at strengthening the board of directors and audit committees function, and 
ensuring BOD and audit committee discharge their roles and responsibilities effectively. The highlighted 
amendments on audit committee were on the criteria of audit committee member, the composition of audit 
committees, the frequency of meetings and the need for continuous training. 
As supervised by the MCCG 2007, the audit committee heavy function is to monitor on the aspect of 
accountability and audit, therefore, the audit committee member must comprise of at least three members on which 
majority of them are independent and all members must be non-executive directors. In addition, the members of the 
audit committee must financially literate and at least one is a member of an accounting association i.e. Malaysian 
Institute of Accountancy. The audit committee members also must aware on their authorities and duties as it must be 
spelt out clearly in a written term of references. From the criteria outline by the MCCG, the audit committee 
function is towards the financial matters and the audit committee is to act as the external entities that monitor and 
supervise the financial performance of a company.  
On matter of finance, it is closely related to the external auditor, finance director and the internal auditor. Audit 
Committee needs to review and has the power to appoint the external auditor, decide on the audit fee and matters 
related to resignation or dismissal.  Audit committee also need to discuss with the external auditor before the audit 
process on the nature and scope of the audit and co-ordination of audit in case of more than one audit firms are 
involved. Moreover, audit committee expertise is needed in reviewing the financial statement and discuss with the 
external auditors on the matters raise during the audit process and to discuss with internal auditors on issues 
pertaining to internal audit process. 
In the MCCG, audit committee need to have a professional relationship with the external auditors whereby, the 
audit committee should meet with the external auditors without executive board members present at least twice a 
year. This is an important communication opportunity as external auditors is considered external party not related to 
the operation and management, the views and suggestion can improve the performance of the company as it is 
discussed with audit committee whom are independent non-executive directors. Apart from that audit committee, 
finance director, head of internal audit and external auditors should meet and discuss upon the invitation of the audit 
committee to gather views and information on financial affair.   
4.  Empirical studies on the audit committee quality  
4.1. Audit committee quality and composition of the committee 
4.1.1 Financial experts 
In Australia, Baxter (2010) analyzes several indicators of audit committee quality such as board composition, 
board activity, auditor type and leverage. The result of the study revealed that majority of the sample complies with 
the rule outline by Australian Securities Exchange corporate governance. It indicates that board composition, board 
activity, auditor type and leverage contribute to the quality of audit committee. Audit committee function is closely 
related to the financial aspect as the expertise is required to overview the financial statement and provides 
suggestion to serve the interest of the shareholders. The Final Rules (Securities and Exchange Commission of USA, 
2003) deﬁne audit committee ﬁnancial expert as a person with an understanding of GAAP and ﬁnancial statements 
to be able to assess the general application in connection with the accounting, possess experience in preparing, 
auditing, analyzing or evaluating ﬁnancial statements, understand the internal controls procedures for ﬁnancial 
reporting and audit committee functions. 
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Iyer et al. (2013) examined the financial experts characteristics especially in the field of accounting or general 
management experience are most value in designating audit committee member in USA. Having financial experts is 
indeed important as reading and understanding financial statement need technical expertise which possesses by 
those whom having accounting related background and experience. Their study found that, the BOD valued 
positively accounting certification and audit committee experience rather than general management experience 
because accounting knowledge and audit experience are valuable and contribute to less earnings management and 
better internal control. Sharing the same view is Hoistash & Hoistash (2009), where the composition of financial 
expertise on the audit committee has been generally found to contribute to earnings quality. Abbott et al. (2004) and 
Bedard et al. (2004) also agree that the presence of ﬁnancial experts on the audit committee is associated with less 
earnings restatements and earnings management.  Farber (2005) also found that most fraudulent organizations have 
less ﬁnancial experts in the audit committee. These consistent views suggest that audit committees with more 
expertise are more likely to understand complex accounting issues thus provide better internal control.  
 
4.1.2. Size of audit committee  
 
De Fond and Francis (2005) claimed that a larger size of an audit committee will prompt the board to distribute 
more resources to improve the quality of ﬁnancial reports. Larger audit committees provide access to greater 
resources and managerial talent, thus providing more effective monitoring (Yin et al., 2012). As advised by the 
Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance (2007) the board of directors should establish an audit committee 
comprising at least three members, a majority of whom are independent. All members of the audit committee should 
be non-executive directors (NED). Hemraj (2004) noted that an effective and the caliber audit committee should 
comprise of at least three non-executive directors to ensure no unresolved issue of concern are ascertained. 
Furthermore, the size of the audit committee should be sufficient and suitable as to carry significant weight in the 
board decision. However, a specific number is not suitable to be determined as it depends on the size of the firm. 
Avison and Cowton (2012) discuss the behavior of companies in response to the revised UK revised code. The study 
found a positive association between company size and the size of audit committees where the smaller size firm has 
at least two audit committee and for larger companies have at least three AC. The study concludes that even it is to 
be claimed that suitable size of the audit committee are difficult to determine, it also at the same time should not be 
overloaded with work and that corporate governance requirements are technical and tedious jobs. 
 
4.1.3. Independent of the committee  
 
According to Avison & Cowton (2012), the independence in the board composition of corporate governance is 
important as the board performs an effective monitoring role and thus ensure conformity on the part of executive 
management; provide an autonomous view due to the separation of ownership control and therefore minimizes the 
agency problems such as master and servant relationship. To be independent is vital as it did not involve conflict of 
interest as the independent body is functioning to provide an autonomous view based on the information gathered 
and is viewable to the larger interest who is the shareholders. The Smith Committee (2003) had recommended four 
criteria of good audit committee, first, all members of the committee should be independent non-executive director, 
second the board should have at least one member with recent and relevant experience, third the appointments of the 
AC should be for a period of three years, finally the renewable period of not more than two additional three-year 
periods as long as the members continue to be independent.  
Larry and Taylor (2012) pointed out that, Independent directors are considered to be better equipped to sustain 
the integrity and governance due to zero personal or economic ties with executive management and considered as 
professional referees whose oversee and monitor the company’s executive management. Furthermore, DeZoort & 
Salterio (2001) find that independent directors are more likely to support external auditors over executive 
management in external auditor-management conflict situations. This view is supported by the study of Zalailah & 
Stewart (2012) on Malaysian context of audit committee function in resolving auditor-client disagreements found 
that the independent plays a mediating role as a third-party intermediary who provides assistance to resolve the 
dispute. The authority of the committee to act as a mediator comes from its oversight responsibilities, its 
understanding and awareness of possible issues.  
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The study by Larry & Taylor (2012) examine the effectiveness of audit committee governance and role in 
delivering stronger audit committee independence and competence.  The results reveal that stronger audit committee 
independence and competence, but not diligence, are significantly related to a lower incidence and severity of 
financial restatements. It indicates the independence criteria contribute to the better internal control and 
performance. Avison and Cowton (2012) examined the independence compliance factor in UK companies after the 
revised code found that general compliance with many provisions of the Revised Code was found as most of the 
companies in the sample exceeded the minimum stipulated requirements under the code. However, in about a 
quarter of cases the chairman was a member, and in some cases, directors were not independent, but the companies 
that fail to comply with the code provide reasoned and explanation of the non-compliance. 
 
4.2.  The relationship between audit committee and communication 
 
4.2.1. Communication with the management 
 
The role of audit committee in ensuring good internal control and corporate governance of an organization is 
very critical. On top of that, the audit committee responsibilities are to review and liaison with external auditor, 
internal auditor and the management. There is a risk in delegating too many responsibilities to the audit committee 
(Zaman, 2001). The responsibilities of audit committee cover the management, financial and auditing affairs thus to 
ease the burden frequent meeting need to be conducted to ensure that the audit committee is comprehend and 
updated with the issue relating to the audit committee duties and functions.  
Vanasco (1994) outline four effective interface for audit committee communication with the management i.e. (i) 
to provide committee members with an agenda for meetings in advance of those meetings; (ii) to ensure that the 
meetings of the audit committee are informative; (iii) to ensure that all relevant financial reports and SEC 
documents are regularly distributed to committee members; and (iv) to familiarize committee members with 
company operations and financial affairs that significantly affect financial and operational reporting. It is important 
that the communication between the audit committee with financial and operational management to ensure better 
prospect of interface and action on unresolved problems.  
Carcello et al. (2002) also argue that diligence should be determined by the number of meetings and the behavior 
of individual members surrounding such meetings (e.g. preparation before meetings, attentiveness and participation 
during meetings, and post-meeting follow-ups). It is important that, the audit committee interface with financial and 
operational management about financial and operating reports forces management to take action on unresolved 
problems due to the fact that audit committee act as a third party evaluator a part from the auditor and as watchdog 
to protect the shareholders’ interest. 
 
4.2.2. Communications with internal auditor 
 
Apart from acting as the oversight body to corporate management and financial aspect, audit committee also is a 
body that able to holds and retains shareholders trust in order to ensure smooth running of business operation. It is 
pointed out by Vanosco (1994), in fulfilling their expanded oversight responsibilities, these committees must rely on 
internal auditors for much of their information concerning corporate activities. Furthermore, the UK Financial 
Reporting Council (Smith Committee, 2003) states that the audit committee should review and approve the internal 
audit functions remit to ensure that the function has the necessary resources. In addition, information to enable it to 
fulfil its mandate must be easily accessible as it contributes in performing appropriate professional standards for 
internal auditors. 
A research by Zaman & Sarens (2013) on informal audit committee interaction and internal audit function found 
that audit committee and internal audit functions engaging in informal interactions in addition to formal regular 
meetings complement formal meetings with as it represent additional opportunities for the audit committees to 
monitor internal audit functions. The informal interactions are significantly and positively associated with audit 
committee independence, audit chair’s knowledge and experience, and internal audit quality. The result of study 
contribute to the assumption that, meeting whether formal or informal between the internal auditor allow 
information flow because internal auditor possess more information as the internal audit function covered the whole 
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organization. From the meetings, the audit committee can demand for better internal controls through internal audit 
as it may lead to greater focus on internal controls.  
Moreover, audit committee members rely on the work of the internal audit function to develop their own 
appreciation of risk management and internal control effectiveness (Arena & Azzone, 2009; Zaman & Sarens, 2013; 
Krishnan, 2005). The interactions in formal or informal meetings between audit committee and the internal audit 
function can reduce information asymmetry and provide resources for risk assessment. It is an important resource to 
the audit committee in discharging its responsibilities and enhancing the effectiveness of the audit committee. 
 
4.2.3. Communication among the audit committee 
 
It is to assume that, frequent meeting among the audit committee, management, internal auditors and external 
auditors generates clear flow of information. The results of Yin et al. (2012), Sharma et al. (2009) and Raghunandan 
& Rama (2007) found that there is a significantly positive relationship between the proportion of accounting experts 
as well as independence on the committee and the number of audit committee meetings. The result of the study 
indicate that, the audit committee with the same area of expertise and independence contribute to frequent meetings 
as there is synergy among the member as well as being able to spend more time to review the internal auditing plans 
and results.  
Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) documented that the frequency of committee meetings is a good measure for 
diligence and frequent audit committee meetings are associated with less fraud. Yin et al. (2012) pointed out that, 
the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) recommends a minimum of four meetings a year for an audit committee to be 
effective. Big 4 audit firms is often regarded as having good reputation in conducting the high quality audit, it is in 
fact proposed by KPMG (1999) audit committee meeting need to be carry out between three and four meetings a 
year, while the PwC (1997) recommends a minimum of four meetings a year for an audit committee to be effective. 
The UK Revised Code also recommends at least three meetings per annum for larger companies (Avison, 2010).  
Evidently, from the suggestion and prior researches, it can be concluded that audit committee needs to meet and 
interact to each other discussing matters related to management and financial at least three times a year or once 
every quarter year. In the MCCG, the code encourages frequent meetings among the management, internal auditors 
and external auditors. However, the number of meeting frequency is not specifically suggested as the details of the 
meeting need to be disclosed in the financial report.   
Empirically, Sharma et al. (2009) claimed that larger audit committees provide access to greater resources and 
managerial talent, thus providing more effective monitoring. This may reduce the demand for more frequent 
meetings. However, Raghunandan & Rama (2007) and Al-Najjar (2011) discovered that the size of an audit 
committee has a positive relationship with the number of audit committee meetings. Adelopo et al. (2011) found 
that, the board meeting frequency may indicate a measure of its effectiveness and diligence even though, board 
meetings represent additional operating costs to the ﬁrm. Nevertheless, frequency of meetings could be indicative of 
audit committee activity and a higher number of non-executive directors on the board have been found to increase 
audit committee activity (Avison, 2010). The audit committee is the part of the board that has the remit to ensure 
auditing and reporting quality; therefore an increased number of non-executive directors enhance audit committee 
activity which may enhance auditing and reporting quality in firms subsequently, improve firm transparency and 
enhance market confidence. 
5. Suggestion for Improvement of Audit Committee Practices in Malaysia 
The agency theory has been used in many researches and studies as the basis to the problem of conflict 
relationship between the owners and the management. The emergence of corporate governance as an oversight body 
to advise and protect the interest of the shareholders is in view to reduce issues in a corporate scandal. However, in 
Malaysia, corporate governance is defined as “The process and structure used to direct and manage the business and 
affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate 
objective of realizing long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interests of other stakeholders” 
(MCCG, 2012).  
From the definition of MCCG, it is clearly mentioned that the interest of the stakeholder is also falls under the 
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scope of corporate governance development. Due to that, Muneeza & Hassan (2014) have pointed out that the 
corporate governance in Malaysia to be aligned with shari’ah corporate governance which has three main 
components which are responsibility to God, responsibility to the shareholders and responsibility to the 
stakeholders. The fundamental objective of shari’ah corporate governance is to run the corporation according to the 
principles of Islamic law. This is because the reason for creating Islamic corporation is to distinguish itself from the 
conventional rules of corporate governance. There are several shari’ah governance codes or guidelines issued 
speciﬁcally for Islamic Financial Institutions by several countries such as Malaysia and organisations or institutions 
such as AAOIFI and IFSB. 
The Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) is a common terms in Islamic banks corporate governance. The duties 
and responsibilities of the SSB are to advise board of directors on shari’ah matters to ensure that the operations 
comply with Shari’ah principles at all time, endorsing and validating relevant documentations pertaining to the 
products and services, as well as the internal policies and manuals and marketing advertisements (Hassan, 2009). 
The dynamic development of the SSB required every Islamic company shall have an independent Shari’ah 
committee. Independent Shari’ah play role same as to the SSB committee to supervise the activities and 
management of Islamic corporation is necessary as these scholars would be in a better position to advice on the 
doubtful activities happening in the company according to the vagaries of the economy. However, The Shari’ah 
committee’s decisions shall be binding on the BOD; if not the Shari’ah committee function would be useless.  
Muneeza and Hassan (2014) suggested that the Sub-committees of the Shari’ah committee shall be in all 
departments of the company to facilitate the main Shari’ah committee on everything which is happening in the 
corporation without depending and waiting for the oral or written reports of the department heads. Since the Prophet 
Muhammad PBUH, the practice of Shura group or discussion was conducted among his companions to discuss all 
matters related to life, muamalah and ibadah.  In the context of Shari’ah corporate governance, the decisions of the 
corporation should also be based on Shura or consultation. As suggested by Muneeza and Hassan (2014), the 
structure may be based on two tier system in which an independent Shari’ah board would be set up to safeguard the 
Islamic value and element of the corporation while the Board of Directors responsible in managing and directing the 
corporation govern by Shari’ah laws. Consequent to the Shari’ah governance, a Shari’ah audit shall be carried out to 
ensure that the operation is complying with the Shari’ah rules and accountable to God, shareholders, stakeholders 
and to the society.  
As stated in Muneeza & Hasan (2014), Shari’ah corporate governance comprises of two structural models, 
namely (i) Tawheed and Shura based approach and (ii) stakeholders based approach. In Tawheed and Shura 
approach, the most important constituents are Shari’ah board and the of Shura groups; whose participants are the 
stakeholders. The two groups would interact and consult each other before taking any decision with regard to the 
corporation. However, the issues of SSBs are related to the functions that Shariah board implementation, 
independence, confidentiality, competence, consistency and disclosures are some of the important issues related to 
the functions (Grais & Pellegrini, 2006, Alnasser & Muhammad, 2012). In addition, Grais & Pellegrini (2006) 
reported that current Shariah practices compliance relies on the internal corporate structure and the limited 
availability of scholars with both Shariah background and financial skills. 
6. Conclusion 
With the increase in complexities in business transaction and the sophisticated financial derivatives, it is crucial 
to ensure adequate disclosure of information to shareholders as well as stakeholders. The corporate scandals around 
the world such as the Enron, World Com and Telco, had marked a failure in corporate management and reporting. It 
indicated that the accounting system, internal and external auditing is not sufficient in curbing the problems of 
financial fraud. As the consequences, the development of code of corporate governance and the establishment of 
numerous rules and regulations, for example the Sarbanes Oxley Act, Blue Ribbon Committee and Turnball Report, 
act as responses to the global corporate failures.  
The emergence of corporate governance, especially the audit committee sheds light and hopes to better improve 
the financial reporting of the institutions. The oversight body is required to be accountable for the accounting, 
reporting and auditing process to ensure the communications to the users are transparent and with integrity. 
However, above all, the most important factor apart from technical and system failure is the ethical matter that needs 
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to be addressed. Robins (2006) pointed out the same conclusion that the ethical and cultural dimension is more 
fundamental as ethical conduct can be the best prevention to any corporate scandals. The greed and selfishness 
contribute to the misconduct of resources. Therefore, it is vital to develop a code that best suit the actual behavior 
and ethical conduct blend with the cultural environment to establish a sound code of corporate governance.  
Finally, it is also suggested that the Malaysian code of corporate governance could embedded the Shari’ah 
corporate governance which emphasized on the responsibility to God, responsibility to the shareholders and 
responsibility to the stakeholders, as each individual who carries the trust is accountable to God, shareholders and 
stakeholders. As there is a suggestion to embed the Shari’ah corporate governance into the decisions of the 
corporation, the actual survey will be carried out as to measure the perceptions of the public, practices as well as the 
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